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Abstract The goal of three experiments was to study
whether rats are aware of the difference between absence
of events and lack of evidence. We used a Pavlovian
extinction paradigm in which lights consistently signaling
sucrose were suddenly paired with the absence of sucrose.
The crucial manipulation involved the absent outcomes in
the extinction phase. Whereas in the Cover conditions,
access to the drinking receptacle was blocked by a metal
plate, in the No Cover conditions, the drinking receptacle
was accessible. The Test phase showed that in the Cover
conditions, the measured expectancies of sucrose were
clearly at a higher level than in the No Cover conditions.
We compare two competing theories potentially explaining
the findings. A cognitive theory interprets the observed
effect as evidence that the rats were able to understand that
the cover blocked informational access to the outcome
information, and therefore the changed learning input did
not necessarily signify a change of the underlying contin-
gency in the world. An alternative associationist account,
renewal theory, might instead explain the relative sparing
of extinction in the Cover condition as a consequence of
context change. We discuss the merits of both theories as
accounts of our data and conclude that the cognitive
explanation is in this case preferred.
Keywords Event representation  Contingency learning 
Extinction  Renewal
Introduction
The coordination between subjective experiences and
mental representations of the world is a daunting task that
all intelligent organisms face. Experiences only provide
incomplete information about the current state of the world
and are notoriously ambiguous. One example comes from
object permanence research, in which objects are first
shown to children and then are moved behind an occluder
(Piaget 1937/1954). In this situation, children have a choice
between assuming that the object has suddenly ceased to
exist or that it has just gone out of sight for the time being.
A second example, which has received scant attention
and is the focus of the current experiments, involves con-
tingency learning. In contingency learning, we do not track
individual objects (such as in object permanence studies)
but pick up statistical regularities between types of events.
For example, one of Pavlov’s dogs (Pavlov 1927) may
have learned that tone signals are regularly followed by
food presentations. Now imagine that the contingency
suddenly seems to have changed, with continued tone
signals but no access to food (what Pavlov termed extinc-
tion). This creates an ambiguity the dog must resolve.
Either the world has changed so that the new contingency
reflects a change of the underlying causal structure, or the
world has not changed but the dog somehow missed the
food. If the dog assumes that the world typically contains
stable causal relationships, then the change of the experi-
enced contingency needs to be attributed by the dog to the
information that reached its senses rather than to a change
of contingencies in the world. Assuming causal stability,
the dog might conclude that it has simply not seen the food
because it was hidden or occluded from sight.
In the present studies, we investigated the capacity to
resolve ambiguities in contingency learning in rats, a
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species whose learning processes are, in the literature,
predominantly modeled by associative theories. Traditional
behaviorist theories of associative learning were ill-equip-
ped to resolve the described ambiguities in the informa-
tional input. Events were typically coded as present or
absent with associations directly reflecting experienced
contingencies (e.g., Rescorla and Wagner 1972). Distin-
guishing between experienced contingencies and contin-
gencies in the world is beyond the representational
assumptions of traditional stimulus–response (S–R) theo-
ries and was largely ignored in Pavlov’s (1927) seminal
work on stimulus–stimulus (S–S) learning.
In the past decades, the focus in associative theorizing
has changed from a behaviorist S-R perspective to a more
cognitive focus on mental representations of learning
events that take part in learning. Currently, classical con-
ditioning is in most cases modeled as involving associa-
tions between mental representations of the world (S–S
learning; see Delamater and Oakeshott 2007; Holland
1990, for an overview). According to this view, cues (e.g.,
tones) may elicit images of predicted outcomes (e.g., food),
which in turn may elicit visible responses. Moreover, cues
may also activate images of each other (Larkin et al. 1998)
or may acquire perceptual processing of outcomes in their
absence (Holland 1990).
Allowing images to be part of learning processes dra-
matically increases the representational power in learning
but creates the problem of reality monitoring (see also
Holland 1990). How does a learning system operating on
images decide whether the relations between the images
reflect reality, or are just illusory correlations? If in
extinction learning, for example, the cues are followed by
images of the outcome, then how is it possible that an
organism learns that the underlying contingency has
changed?
To avoid insensitivity to the changes in the world, the
learning system needs to be able to compare the elicited
images to the real events, and distinguish between events
and images. Holland (1990) reported evidence showing
that rats indeed distinguish between images and events.
This distinction is fairly easy when the elicited images can
be directly compared to experiences of present events (e.g.,
food). When no sensory information about the presence of
the event is available, however, the organism needs to
decide whether the event is actually absent or whether the
current information about the event is inconclusive because
perceptual access to the event is blocked.
Experimental task and conditions
In the following experiments, we investigated whether rats
are sensitive to the difference between absence of events
and lack of evidence. We approached this question using a
conventional Pavlovian extinction paradigm. In the two
crucial experimental conditions, in Phase 1, the Acquisition
phase, rats learned over several days about a perfect con-
tingency between a cue, a light signal, and sucrose in the
receptacle of a Skinner box. In Phase 2, the contingency
was changed to zero (i.e., extinction) for the two groups of
rats. Sucrose was always absent regardless of the presence
or absence of the light cue. In Phase 3, the Test phase, the
cues were presented without sucrose again, and we mea-
sured nose pokes for sucrose in the receptacle.
The crucial manipulation involved Phase 2 that con-
trasted two conditions. In Experiments 1 and 2, in all
conditions, a metal plate was attached on the receptacle
throughout the experiment (see Fig. 1). In the No Cover
condition, a small opening provided access to the recep-
tacle (Fig. 1, left panel). Thus, in this condition, the rats
could directly experience that sucrose was absent during
the extinction phase. Additional control conditions were
also included in the experiments.
Two competing theoretical accounts
In recent years, theories that grant more sophisticated
cognitive competencies to rats than traditional associa-
tionist models have become increasingly popular (see
Blaisdell and Waldmann 2012). A cognitive account would
predict for our tasks that in the No Cover condition, rats
should learn in the Extinction phase that the contingency
has changed, which should manifest itself in a decrease of
search time in the Test phase. By contrast, in the Cover
condition, a metal plate blocked access to the receptacle
during extinction, thereby preventing the rats from check-
ing whether sucrose was present or absent behind the plate
(Fig. 1, right panel). As in the No Cover condition, the
presence of the light cue was followed by the absence of
the experience of the sucrose outcome. If the rats did not
distinguish between absence (No Cover) and lack of evi-
dence (Cover), rats in both conditions should show low
expectancies (i.e., extinction). On the other hand, if rats
understand that the metal plate blocks access to informa-
tion about the sucrose, they should understand that in Phase
2, the contingency between the light and sucrose might still
be intact despite the fact that the metal plates make it
impossible to monitor this contingency. Of course, the
contingency information is ambiguous; it could also be the
case that the contingency has changed behind the cover. If
the rats assume that causal relations in the world are typ-
ically stable, the conclusion that the contingency is intact
seems more plausible, but should be tempered with a cer-
tain degree of uncertainty.
However, there is a popular competing associationist
account that makes similar behavioral predictions but does
not require the attribution of sophisticated cognitive
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representations. According to renewal theory, the differ-
ences between the Cover and No Cover conditions may be
due to the fact that in the Cover condition, a context change
has taken place (Bouton and Bolles 1979). In a typical
renewal paradigm, a conditioned response is established in
Context A, whereas extinction takes place in Context B. In
this paradigm, it is typically found that rats and other
organisms, when tested in Context A again, show an
immediate return of the conditioned response, the renewal
effect. Apparently, extinction is bound to its specific con-
text and does not generalize to the original learning con-
text. One popular explanation of this pattern is that context
plays the role of an occasion setter for the learning and
extinction episodes (see Bouton 2004; Bouton and Bolles
1979; Delamater 2004). Thus, on the view that the intro-
duction of the intact metallic shield in the Cover condition
constitutes a salient context change, it can be argued that
extinction should be diminished in the Test phase because
extinction training occurred in a context that was different
from both the learning and the test conditions.
Initial research on the renewal effect made context
change as salient as possible (e.g., different rooms), which
also makes it plausible on a cognitive account that learners
may be aware of the specificity of the learning and
extinction contexts. However, more recently, it has been
shown that subtle differences in context show renewal
effects. Thomas et al. (2003), for example, found that small
changes of odor, location within a room, or unintended
differences between Skinner boxes suffice to create
renewal effects. Bouton (2004) reports various studies that
show that renewal effects can also be obtained when
organisms had ingested different drugs during different
phases of the learning sessions. Thus, on the basis of these
findings, the presence or absence of a metallic cover could
very well constitute a relevant context change according to
renewal theory.
How can the two theoretical paradigms be tested against
each other? One problem of testing our cognitive account
against renewal theory is that renewal theory is more
general, so that any behavioral predictions by a cognitive
account can be mimicked by renewal theory. Given that
any manipulation of cognitive representations across dif-
ferent phases of the extinction paradigm requires us to
change aspects of the stimulus characteristics of the task, it
will always be possible for a renewal theorist to postulate
post hoc that the chosen changes in the stimuli and the task
constitute a relevant context change. And if the data do not
show a renewal effect, it can be argued post hoc that the
context change was not salient enough to affect learning.
Thus, from a post hoc perspective, it is impossible to prove
that renewal theory is inadequate. Although this flexibility
of renewal theory may look like a strength, it is also a
weakness. Whereas our cognitive account makes clear
predictions about relevant and irrelevant context changes,
it is less clear how renewal theory can predict which one of
otherwise similar context changes will exhibit a renewal
effect.
We will capitalize on this weakness by testing our the-
ory in a paradigm in Experiment 3, in which we imple-
mented superficially similar context changes in both the
Cover and the No Cover conditions. In both conditions, the
metallic plate was only present in the Extinction phase, but
not shown in the other three phases (i.e., magazine training,
Acquisition training, and Test phase). Thus, in both
experimental conditions, similar context changes were
implemented. Moreover, in both conditions, we used the
same intact metallic plate. The crucial manipulation was
that in the No Cover condition, the metallic shield was
slightly moved a couple of inches away from its usual
position on the receptacle, so that it did not obstruct the
opening anymore. According to our theory, this should
make a huge difference, but on an account that is sensitive
No Cover Cover
Fig. 1 Pictures of the apparatus configurations in the No Cover (left panel) and Cover (right panel) conditions. In the Cover condition, a metal
plate blocked access to the drinking receptacle
Anim Cogn (2012) 15:979–990 981
123
only to context change, it is unclear how it can be justified
that in Experiment 3 the context changes in the Cover
condition should be relevant, whereas the context change in
the No Cover condition should not. Without implicitly
using a cognitive interpretation of the task, it is hard to see
how a theory devoid of the representational resources of
cognitive theories can justify such a prediction (see also
‘‘General discussion’’).
Experiment 1
The main goal of this experiment was to provide initial
empirical evidence for our prediction that extinction should
be sensitive to the presence or absence of a cover hiding the
drinking receptacle. In the experiment, rats first learned a
contingency between a light signal and sucrose and then
underwent an extinction phase, in which sucrose was
generally absent. The crucial manipulation was whether a
full cover (Cover condition) was placed over the recepta-
cle, or a cover that left a small opening (No Cover). We
predicted that the extinction phase will have less influence
on the search behavior in the Test phase for rats in the
Cover than in the No Cover condition, although, due to the
ambiguity of whether sucrose is present or absent behind
the cover, there may still be a small tendency toward some
extinction in the Cover group.
Subjects
Sixteen experimentally naı¨ve female Long-Evans rats
(Rattus norvegicus) acquired from Harlan (Indianapolis,
IN) served as subjects. Subjects were pair-housed in
transparent plastic tubs with a wood shaving substrate in a
vivarium maintained on a 12-h light/dark cycle. Experi-
ments were conducted during the dark portion of the cycle.
A progressive food restriction schedule was imposed prior
to the beginning of the experiment, which allowed us to
maintain rats at 85 % of their initial free-feeding weights.
All animals were handled for 45 s during the 3 days prior
to the initiation of the study. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of two groups (ns = 8): Cover and No
Cover.
Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a small room containing
eight Skinner boxes. Each Skinner box measured 30 9 25 9
20 cm (L 9 W 9 H) and was housed in a separate sound- and
light-attenuating environmental isolation chest (ENV-008,
Med Associates, Georgia, VT). The front and back walls and
ceiling of the chamber were constructed of clear Plexiglas,
the side walls were made of aluminum, and the floors were
constructed of stainless steel rods measuring 0.5 cm in
diameter, spaced 1.5 cm center-to-center. The enclosure was
dimly illuminated by a 28-V bulb (ENV-215 M, Med Asso-
ciates) house light located 2 cm from the top of the left-side
chamber wall house light.
Each chamber was equipped with a water-dipper (ENV-
202 M, Med Associates) that could be lowered into a
trough of sucrose solution (20 % by volume) and raised.
When in the raised position, a small well (0.05 cc) at the
end of the dipper arm that contained sucrose solution
protruded up into the drinking receptacle. Delivery of the
sucrose solution served as the appetitive outcome (called
an Unconditioned Stimulus or US in conventional Pav-
lovian terminology). The drinking receptacle could be
covered with one of two types of stainless steel metal plates
(each 12.5 cm high 9 6.5 cm wide) that were held in place
by two 3.5-cm-diameter circular magnets (each 15 lbs.
force), one placed above and one placed below the recep-
tacle opening (see Fig. 1). One type of metal plate had a
2.5 cm high 9 4.4 cm wide opening (the bottom edge of
the opening was flush with the bottom edge of the drinking
receptacle). This opening allowed access to the drinking
receptacle (Fig. 1, left panel). The other type of metal plate
was completely solid, so when in place it prevented
physical or visual access to the receptacle (Fig. 1, right
panel). A diffuse light (ENV-227 M, Med Associates) was
located 2 cm from the top of the right-side chamber wall,
directly above the opening of the drinking receptacle, and
when flashed at a rate of 2 (on–off) cycles per second
served as the conditional stimulus (CS) (i.e., the signal or
cue). Ventilation fans in each enclosure and a white noise
generator on a shelf outside of the enclosures provided a
constant 62-dB(A) background noise.
The chamber in which training, extinction, and testing
took place stayed the same for each rat. Although not all 8
subjects of each condition were run at the same time, each
rat was run at the same time of the day. Moreover, the time
of day was controlled for by way of counterbalancing—we
ran 2 squads of 8 rats, and each squad consisted of subjects
from all groups.
We measured expectation of sucrose by monitoring
feeder activity in the receptacle where sucrose was deliv-
ered during training. Whenever the rat placed its nose into
the receptacle (a nose poke), it disrupted an infrared pho-
tobeam projected across the entrance to the hopper. Nose
pokes were defined as the amount of time (every 100 ms)
that rats broke the infrared beam in the drinking receptacle
with their noses.
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Procedure
Magazine training
Day 1. During this phase, the drinking receptacle in each
chamber was covered with a metal plate that had an
opening to allow access. Rats could explore the box and
drink from the dipper containing sucrose, which delivered
sucrose solution every 20 ± 15 s (actual ITI values = 5,
10, 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 s, selected randomly). The
familiarization phase lasted 60 min; sucrose was delivered
independently of the rats’ behavior. The number of nose
pokes was used as an indicator of learning.
Phase 1: acquisition
Days 2–10. During this phase, the drinking receptacle in
each chamber was covered with a metal plate that had an
opening to allow access to the receptacle (Fig. 1, left panel).
All rats received 2 light-sucrose pairings per 60-min session
on the first 2 days and then 4 pairings on the remaining days.
The difference was due to a software error on the first
2 days. On each trial, the light was presented for 10 s fol-
lowed immediately after it terminated with a 10-s presen-
tation of sucrose. Trials were delivered with a mean interval
of 15 ± 3 min (actual ITI values were 8 and 34 min on the
two trial days, and 12, 18, 18, and 12 min on the days with
four trials). We recorded all nose pokes (i.e., breaks in the
photobeam) emitted during the light (i.e., 10 s) and during a
30-s period prior to the onset of the light. The 30-s pre-CS/
10-s CS measure is a convention commonly adopted by our
and other laboratories. To assess learning, we calculated
discrimination indices to measure acquisition of excitatory
responding for sucrose during the light (i.e., an increase
above baseline in time spent nose poking). Discrimination
indices were calculated as difference scores between pre-
light and light nose-poke responding. Since we measured
pre-light responding for 30 s, we divided this value by 3 to
obtain an averaged value that corresponds to the 10 s of CS
responding. Thus, if we report an ‘‘increase above baseline’’
value of 25, for example, it will mean that on average
subjects made 25 nose pokes per 10-s CS period above and
beyond the rate that they did during baseline (pre-CS). One
rat from the No Cover group showed lower rates of nose
poking by Day 9 of Phase 1 relative to the other subjects
(i.e., discrimination ratio below 0.8) and therefore received
an additional Acquisition session on Day 10 (extra session
not shown in Fig. 2).
Phase 2: extinction
Days 11–13. Prior to Phase 2, for rats in Group Cover, the
drinking receptacle was covered with a metal plate that did
not have an opening, thereby preventing access to the
receptacle (Fig. 1, right panel). Although the dipper was
again lifted in this condition (no noticeable vibrations for
the human ear), with the metal plates in place the rats could
not investigate the drinking receptacle, and thus could not
visually determine the status of the sucrose dipper. For rats
in the No Cover group, the drinking receptacle in each
chamber was covered with a metal plate that had an
opening to allow access to the receptacle (Fig. 1, left
panel). Again, the dipper was lifted but did not contain
sucrose. Thus, rats in the Cover and No Cover groups
received 12 presentations of the light alone in each 30-min
session, with a mean intertrial interval of 2.5 min (i.e., 1, 2,
3, and 4 min, randomly picked). For subjects in the No
Cover condition, we recorded all nose pokes emitted during
a 30-s period prior to the onset of the light and during the
presentation of the light. This allowed us to calculate a
discrimination index for this group, which serves as a
measure of excitatory responding for sucrose during the
light. Similar measures could not be made for subjects in
the condition with a cover.
Test phase
Days 14–19. During this phase, the drinking receptacle in
each chamber was covered with a metal plate that had an
opening to allow access to the receptacle (Fig. 1, left
panel). In each 35-min test session, rats received 4 test
trials with the light but no sucrose. These test presentations
occurred at 8, 16, 24, and 32 min into the session. We
recorded all nose pokes emitted during each 30-s interval
prior to the onset of the light and during each presentation
of the light. No sucrose was delivered during these sessions
but, as in prior phases, the (empty) dipper was activated
after each test presentation of the light.
Results and discussion
Figure 2 (top level) shows the nine sessions (extra session
for the slow learners not shown) on Days 2–10. The rats
acquired behavioral control by the light-sucrose contin-
gency equally well regardless of condition (see Fig. 2, top
panel). Since sphericity cannot always be assumed in our
data (Mauchly’s test of sphericity, p \ 0.0001), we used
the Greenhouse–Geisser correction to analyze the within-
subjects tests for both the acquisition and test data of
experiments, whenever necessary. An analysis of variance
using the difference between pre-light and the light nose-
poke responding as an indicator of learning (i.e., discrim-
ination index) only showed an effect of day of learning
session, F(3.43, 48.05) = 41.18, p \ 0.001, MSE =
280.42, but there was no significant difference between
conditions nor an interaction effect.
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Figure 2 (bottom panel) shows the results of the Test
phase for which expectancy of sucrose was measured sub-
sequent to the extinction training (6 sessions on Days
14–19). An analysis of variance conducted on discrimina-
tion difference scores as a measure of expectancy showed
decreasing values across test sessions, F(2.51, 35.14) =
9.89, p \ 0.001, MSE = 114.62. The decrease reflects
further extinction within the Test phase (which actually
embodies further extinction treatment). Importantly, there
was a clear difference between conditions, F(1, 14) =
13.64, p = 0.002, with a significant Condition 9 Session
interaction, F(2.51, 35.14) = 3.19, p = 0.043. A post hoc
test comparing the difference in rates of extinction (defined
as slope) between the Cover and No Cover conditions
revealed a significant effect, t(14) = -2.64, p = 0.02, with
the Cover condition showing a steeper decline (M = -4.71,
SEM = 1.11) than the No Cover condition (M = -1.40,
SEM = 0.58). Further analyses with the Bonferroni
adjustment for multiple comparisons of difference scores
within the first and the last test sessions revealed a
significant difference between the Cover (M = 26.86,
SEM = 5.02) and the No Cover (M = 10.44, SEM = 3.76)
conditions for the first test session, t(14) = 2.62, p = 0.02.
No such difference was found for the final test session,
demonstrating a convergence in scores (Cover condition:
M = 5.34, SEM = 1.81; No Cover condition: M = 3.87,
SEM = 1.87).
In sum, on our cognitive account, the results confirm our
expectation that rats understood the difference between
absence and lack of evidence. When a cover blocked
access to the drinking receptacle during extinction training,
the expectancy of sucrose during light signals remained
Fig. 2 (Top panel) Mean
difference (CS rate per 10 s—
pre-CS rate per 10 s) scores
(discrimination index) as a
function of Phase 1 Acquisition
session for the Cover and No
Cover conditions in Experiment
1. Error bars represent standard
errors. (Bottom panel) Mean
difference (CS—pre-CS) scores
(discrimination index) as a
function of Phase 3 Test session
for the Cover and No Cover
conditions in Experiment 1.
Error bars represent standard
errors
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fairly high in the Test phase as compared to the No Cover
group that received conventional extinction treatment by
having access to the drinking receptacle. Although, relative
to the end of Acquisition training, some extinction was
evident in all groups in the Test phase, the uncertainty
created by the cover appeared to protect the rats in the
Cover condition from complete extinction.
Alternatively, on an associationist account, the results
may be interpreted as evidence for an effect of context
change across the phases (i.e., renewal). It is important to
note that we already tried to weaken the plausibility of this
account by constantly presenting a metallic plate in all
conditions, so that context change was minimal. However,
since the cover needed to be modified in the Cover con-
dition to completely cover the receptacle, it is possible that
this modification gave rise to a renewal effect. In Experi-
ment 3, we will re-visit the question of how the two
competing accounts can be empirically distinguished.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we pursued two aims. First, we wanted to
replicate the effect between the Cover and No Cover
conditions with a larger sample and different treatment
parameters. Second, we included a control condition that
allowed us to assess the degree of extinction in the Cover
and No Cover conditions relative to a baseline of no
extinction. Thus, in the new Acquisition Control condition,
we simply continued contingency treatment in Phase 2
rather than giving the rats’ extinction training.
Subjects and procedure
There were three groups, with 11 female Long-Evans rats
in the Cover, 11 in the No Cover, and 10 in the Acquisition
Control conditions. The equipment and procedure were the
same as for Experiment 1 except where noted below. All
rats received 60 min of magazine training, in which they
were exposed to sucrose solution from the drinking
receptacle. The same ITIs as in Experiment 1 were used.
As in the previous study, nose pokes were measured as
indicators of expectancies. Two subjects that showed a low
amount of licking were given additional magazine training
sessions. Phase 1 Acquisition training was the same as in
Experiment 1 except that all rats received only six con-
secutive days of Phase 1 treatment. In the previous
experiment, we had already obtained performance near the
ceiling after Session 6. Each subject received three light-
sucrose pairings within each daily 30-min session. On
average, the intertrial interval lasted 10 min (actual ITI
values were 9, 10, and 11 min, randomly picked). In Phase
2, the three conditions differed again. Phase 2 lasted
4 days, with 12 trials in each 30-min session. Thus, we ran
one more day of extinction than in Experiment 1 to equate
levels of performance between the two experiments, which
for unknown reasons took longer in Experiment 2. Phase 2
treatment for Groups Cover and No Cover were as
described for Experiment 1. The group Acquisition Control
received continued exposure to the light-sucrose contin-
gency in Phase 2 with 12 light-sucrose pairings. The Test
phase was similar to that of Experiment 1. Again the empty
dippers inside the receptacles were accessible to all rats
following each test trial. All rats received three trials per
30-min session with the same intertrial intervals as in
Experiment 1. Testing continued for 6 days until perfor-
mance in the three conditions merged (i.e., tested to
extinction).
Results and discussion
Figure 3 (top panel) shows the results from the Acquisition
phase as measured by discrimination indices (difference
scores). The contingency between light signals and sucrose
were uniformly acquired in all three conditions, F(3.65,
105.74) = 19.88, p \ 0.0001, and MSE = 244.13. There
was no significant difference between groups nor a signifi-
cant interaction. We additionally analyzed learning perfor-
mance of the Acquisition Control condition in the sessions
that corresponded to extinction training in the Cover and No
Cover conditions. Recall that the control animals received
additional learning trials in this period. The analyses show
that relative to the last session of the regular Acquisition
training sessions, no signs of further learning can be seen in
the behavior. Thus, by Session 6, the ceiling has been
already reached with no additional increases in the four
following sessions, F(4, 50) = 0.223, p = 0.925.
In the Test phase, we replicated the statistical difference
between the experimental conditions from the last experi-
ment (Fig. 3, bottom panel). An analysis of variance on the
discrimination difference score as the dependent measure
showed a decreasing trend across test sessions, F(3.73,
108.15) = 11.14, p \ 0.0001, MSE = 225.72, which sig-
nifies further extinction within the Test phase. More
importantly, there was a clear difference between the
conditions, F(2, 29) = 10.81, p \ 0.0001, which was
moderated by a significant interaction, F(7.46, 108.15) =
3.43, p = 0.002. Planned comparisons showed that up to
the third session, the three conditions significantly differed
before they started to merge. Although the difference
between the Cover and No Cover conditions tended to be
smaller than in Experiment 1, in Session 1, which was
uncontaminated by further extinction, there was again a
clearly significant difference (p = 0.008). Moreover, the
Cover condition was also significantly different from the
Acquisition Control condition in Session 1 (p = 0.012).
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Thus, although the cover again protected from complete
extinction in the Test phase, it did not fully abolish
extinction relative to the Acquisition Control condition.
This middle position makes sense since the cover removed
access to information about the status of the outcome
event. Because either the presence or the absence of
sucrose was possible states of the outcome when the
receptacle was covered, the intermediate response levels
observed in the Cover group seem rational.
Experiment 3
The previous experiments have shown that the presence of
a cover blocking informational access to the receptacle
during the Extinction phase led to diminished extinction
during the Test phase. On a cognitive account, this can be
interpreted as evidence for rats’ sensitivity to the difference
between explicitly absent outcomes versus lack of evidence
about the status of the outcomes. Alternatively, a context
change theory might interpret the findings as evidence for a
renewal effect. According to this theory, the switch from a
metallic shield with an opening during magazine training
and acquisition to a metallic shield without an opening
might constitute a salient context change that could explain
why expectancies of sucrose were again high in the Test
phase in the Cover condition.
The goal of Experiment 3 was to provide a stronger test
of these two competing theories. In Experiment 3, in all
conditions, no metallic shields were presented during
Fig. 3 (Top Panel) Mean
difference (CS—pre-CS) scores
(discrimination index) as a
function of Phase 1 Acquisition
session for the Cover, No
Cover, and Control conditions
in Experiment 2. Error bars
represent standard errors.
(Bottom panel) Mean difference
(CS—pre-CS) scores
(discrimination index) as a
function of Phase 3 Test session
for the Cover, No Cover, and
Acquisition Control conditions
in Experiment 2. Error bars
represent standard errors
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magazine training and the Acquisition phase. Thus, in both
experimental conditions, Cover and No Cover, we intro-
duced an intact metallic plate in the Extinction phase,
which, on a renewal account, should in both cases qualify
as context change. The crucial manipulation involved the
location of the cover during the Extinction phase. Whereas
in the Cover condition, the metallic plate was, as in pre-
vious experiments, placed over the drinking receptacle,
thus obstructing access to information about presence or
absence of sucrose, in the No Cover condition, we placed
the intact metallic plate slightly left of the receptacle where
it did not obstruct access. Thus, in both conditions, the
same metallic plate was introduced in an equally visible
position, which should therefore lead to a renewal effect
relative to an appropriate control condition. By contrast, on
our cognitive account, rats should differentiate between the
condition in which relevant information is inaccessible
(Cover) and the condition in which information about the
absence of sucrose is accessible (No Cover). If this, and not
context change drives the predicted effect, we would
expect that the No Cover condition would show similarly
low expectancies in the Test phase as a regular extinction
condition without any metallic plates. Such a condition
served as our Control condition.
Subjects and procedure
Twenty-four experimentally naı¨ve female Long-Evans rats
served as subjects, which were randomly assigned to three
groups (Cover, No Cover, and Control). The equipment
and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1 except
where noted below. As in the previous experiments, all rats
received 60 min of magazine training with identical ITIs.
In contrast to the previous experiments, no metallic plates
were present. Phase 1 Acquisition training was as in
Experiment 2 except that, due to inexplicably low perfor-
mance by Session 6 in this experiment, we extended
learning to 10 days to establish the learning preconditions
for the following phases. Unlike in the previous studies, no
metallic plates were present throughout this phase. As in
the previous experiments, learning and extinction were
measured using discrimination indices (i.e., difference
scores), which compared nose pokes. Phase 2, Extinction,
progressed for three days like in Experiment 1. In the
Cover condition, a metallic plate prevented access to the
drinking receptacle, as in the previous experiments. By
contrast, in the new No Cover condition, the cover was
intact but moved slightly to the left of the receptacle,
rendering the drinking receptacle completely unobstructed.
In the Control condition, rats received conventional
extinction trials, in which no plates were present in the
chambers. On each day, all subjects received 12 extinction
trials with empty dippers in each 30-min session (ITIs as in
previous studies). Nose pokes served as indicators of
expectancies in the two applicable conditions (No Cover
and Control). During the Test phase, no metal plates were
present in the chambers. Otherwise, testing was similar to
the testing procedure used in the previous experiments (i.e.,
three trials per 30 min). We recorded all nose pokes during
a 30-s pre-CS interval and during the presentation of each
CS. No sucrose was delivered during these sessions. As in
the previous studies, we tested rats for six days.
Results and discussion
One subject from the Control condition failed to learn the
contingency and was therefore dropped from the analyses
(i.e., n = 7 in Control). In each of the two other conditions,
8 subjects participated successfully. Figure 4 (top panel)
shows the results from the Acquisition phase, as measured
by discrimination indices (difference score). The analysis
revealed a main effect of Session, F(5.15,102.98) = 15.53,
p \ 0.001, MSE = 394.6, which indicates that all remain-
ing subjects had successfully acquired knowledge about the
contingency between light and sucrose after the 10 ses-
sions. There was no significant main effect of condition,
F(2, 20) = 2.53, p = 0.104, MSE = 733.8, nor a signifi-
cant interaction (F \ 1).
The most interesting analyses concern the Test phase.
Again we analyzed discrimination indices (difference
score). Not surprisingly, the analysis revealed a main effect
of Test Session, F(5, 100) = 3.10, p = 0.012, MSE =
252.965, signifying additional extinction during the test
trials. Most importantly, the analysis revealed a main effect
of condition, F(1, 20) = 12.130, p \ 0.001, MSE =
878.874. There was no significant interaction, F \ 1. Since
there was no significant interaction, planned comparisons
were conducted comparing each group against every other
group collapsed across all sessions. A significant difference
was found between the Cover condition and both the No
Cover and the Control conditions (p = 0.001 and p \
0.001, respectively). No significant difference was found
between the No Cover and Control conditions (p = 0.434),
however.
In sum, the results show that the presence of a cover
again partially preserved the learned contingency from
extinction in the test trials, whereas extinction was equally
strong regardless of whether a cover was newly introduced
next to the receptacle (No Cover), or no cover was pre-
sented throughout the experiment (Control). The lack of a
difference between the No Cover and Control conditions
indicates that the added presence of a metallic plate in the
chambers did not constitute a relevant context change that
would lead to renewal. Only if the cover had a specific
position, making it uncertain for the learner whether the
outcome was absent or present (behind the cover) was
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behavior observed that indicated that the rats continued to
expect the outcome behind the occluder. In the next sec-
tion, we will discuss the relevance of this finding for the
two competing theories.
General discussion
Coordinating contingency information with representations
of the underlying causal texture of the world is an important
competency of intelligent organisms. Our sensory input
does not always faithfully reflect causal relations and is
therefore ambiguous. Our goal in the present experiments
was to study whether rats display in their behavior sensi-
tivity to this ambiguity.
We used a conventional Pavlovian extinction paradigm
to confront subjects with changes in experienced contin-
gencies. Whereas in the Acquisition phases, rats experi-
enced a perfect contingency between light signals and
sucrose, in the Extinction phases, the light signals were
paired with the absence of perceivable sucrose. The crucial
manipulation involved the presentation of the absent out-
come. Whereas in the Cover conditions, access to the
drinking receptacle was covered by an intact metal plate, in
different variants of the No Cover conditions, the drinking
receptacle was accessible. The results in the Test phase
Fig. 4 (Top panel) Mean
difference (CS—pre-CS) scores
(discrimination index) as a
function of Phase 1 Acquisition
session for the Cover, No
Cover, and Control conditions
in Experiment 3. Error bars
represent standard errors.
(Bottom panel) Mean difference
(CS—pre-CS) scores
(discrimination index) as a
function of Phase 3 Test session
for the Cover, No Cover, and
Control conditions in
Experiment 3. Error bars
represent standard errors
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showed that this manipulation influenced expectancies (i.e.,
nose pokes) in the Test phases. In the Cover conditions, the
measured expectancies of sucrose were clearly at a higher
level in the Test phase than in the No Cover conditions.
We have discussed two theories competing to explain
our findings. On our cognitive account, the observed dif-
ference is consistent with the interpretation that the rats
were able to understand that the cover blocked informa-
tional access to the outcome. Thus, they might have
inferred that sucrose might still be contingent on light
signals, although it was presently not observable. In con-
trast, in the No Cover conditions, the experienced absence
of sucrose was plausibly interpreted as signaling a change
in the underlying contingency.
An alternative associationist account, renewal theory,
attributes differences in the nose pokes in the Test phase to
the presence or absence of context changes (see Bouton
2004; Delamater 2004; Pearce and Bouton 2001). This
theory does not require sophisticated cognitive distinctions
between objects and available information, but rather
assumes that rats simply register visible changes in the
stimuli being part of the learning context. On this account,
in Experiments 1 and 2, in the Cover conditions, the metal
plate looked different during Phase 2 Extinction than dur-
ing the other phases, which might have led to a renewal
effect consistent with the observed behavior. By contrast,
the metal plate remained unmodified across all three phases
in the No Cover conditions. Hence, no renewal was
observed, according to this theory.
To provide stronger evidence for our cognitive account,
we designed Experiment 3, in which there was a similar
context change in both the Cover and the No Cover con-
ditions. In both conditions, an intact metallic plate was
introduced in the chambers during the Extinction phase,
whereas in the previous magazine training, and the
Acquisition and Test phases, no metallic plate was present.
The crucial difference between the conditions was the
placement of the cover: Whereas in the Cover condition,
the metallic plate again blocked access to the drinking
receptacle, in the No Cover condition, it was placed
slightly to the left of the receptacle. Thus, a renewal effect
should be observed in both experimental conditions.
However, as in the other experiments, we found a signifi-
cant difference between the Cover and No Cover condi-
tions in the Test phase.
It is not possible to completely disprove the renewal
account because it always can be adapted post hoc to the
data. The key question is whether such an effect can be
predicted with the theoretical resources of an associationist
theory that denies rats representations about hidden states.
It is unclear how such a prediction could be derived, unless
the theorist smuggles in her own cognitive intuitions about
the task.
Further evidence for cognitive representations
The reported studies are part of an ongoing series, in which
we investigate the cognitive competencies of rats (Blaisdell
et al. 2006, 2009; Fast and Blaisdell 2011; Leising et al.
2008). The present results reveal competencies that go
beyond the representational power of most associative
learning theories. The experiments show that rats do not
only code presence or absence of learning events, but
appreciate that absence of an experience may not neces-
sarily be correlated with the absence of the underlying
event. Most modern learning theories acknowledge that
rats (in contrast to non-mammalian vertebrates) generate
expectancies in both classical and instrumental condition-
ing, which may be either confirmed or frustrated (Colwill
and Rescorla 1986; Papini 2006). Thus, it does not seem
far-fetched to attribute cognitions to rats that go beyond
simple registrations of context features. It is by now a very
well established fact that rats form and test expectancies
during observational and instrumental learning. Our
research goes beyond these findings, however. Confirma-
tion or frustration is only possible on the basis of learning
input. This learning input is ambiguous since it may signal
presence, absence, or alternatively lack of evidence. Our
experiments show that rats seem to appreciate this differ-
ence, which allows them to flexibly coordinate sensory
input with the representations of the underlying events.
One interesting feature of research on animal cognition is
the historical connections between types of theories and
species. Whereas rats have typically been studied in the
context of associative learning theories that are historically
skeptical when it comes to cognitive interpretations (see
extinction theories), researchers have been more open to
these kinds of theories with other species (e.g., primates and
dolphins). The ability to find hidden objects may be such a
pervasive function for successful adaptations that its cogni-
tive precursors may have been part of the competencies of
various species from early on. Thus, our finding that rats are
capable of interpreting the significance of their learning input
may be less surprising than initially thought. Instead, it may
be a natural byproduct of the adaptive goal to obtain stable
representations of the causal texture of the world.
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